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INTRODUCTION

Is it a stream of electrons or stream of commerce?' This is the fundamental problem many courts and commentators have in discussing
1. The phrase "stream of commerce" was used most notably in World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980).
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the Internet. The Internet,2 while commonly known as a storehouse
of information much like an encyclopedia, is also an interactive means

of communication much like a telephone. Indeed, many commentators discuss these various aspects of the Internet in determining how

legal precedent should apply to this new media of communication.3

This Comment will address one distinct aspect of this media-obtaining personal jurisdiction over the creator of an Internet "website"'4 originating out-of-state.
Personal jurisdiction of Internet web-sites can be properly analo-

gized to court precedent.' Both federal and state courts in Texas, as
2. The Internet refers to what has now become a global network of computers
that are linked together through telephone lines and satellites. In the Internet, computers communicate with one another through modems attached to each computer
and software within each computer drives the commands of the person (user) typing
at the keyboard. Cris Shipley & Matthew Fish, Chapter1: The Web and the Internet, 3
COMPUTER LIFE 115 (1996) [hereinafter The Web]. The user commands her personal
computer to call a local main-frame computer through the phone lines, which in turn
is connected to another main-frame computer called a server. The server is the local
Internet provider, such as America Online, CompuServe and AT&T, among others.
Next, the server can communicate with backbone computers that are maintained by
large communications companies such as AT&T or MCI. These backbone computers
can then call the particular server that the user desires if it contains a web-site in its
computer memory. The World Wide Web refers to the collection of web-sites that can
be contacted through the Internet that are located on computers across the world. As
a whole, the Internet is not regulated by any organization, nor is it owned or managed
by any one organization. However, each backbone computer is maintained by the
company which owns it and each server likewise. See id.
3. See, e.g., Richard S. Zembeck, Comment, Jurisdictionand the Internet: Fundamental Fairness in the Networked World of Cyberspace, 6 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 339
(1996) (using general hypothetical situations in describing how courts should acquire
personal jurisdiction in Internet cases). See also William S. Byassee, Jurisdiction of
Cyberspace: Applying Real World Precedent to the Virtual Community, 30 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 197 (1995) (rejecting current precedent as non-applicable to the Internet in favor of changes in the law); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Jurisdictionin Cyberspace, 41 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1996) (using past Supreme Court precedent, combined with
model scenarios in describing how courts should acquire jurisdiction over
nonresidents).
4. A web-site refers to a site that can be called through phone lines from one
computer to another. See The Web, supra note 2. A web-site is merely stored information on a magnetic disk located on a computer. This information is accessed
through the Internet when the user's computer is commanded to call a particular site.
This can be done in numerous ways that make the process seem far removed from
calling, but it is in fact the same as when a person picks up a phone and dials a
number. The computer merely automates the process and makes it faster by allowing
the user to click onto an icon on the computer screen, which in turn commands the
computer to make the call or locate the web-site of interest. The icon is called a
"hyperlink," and activating it commands the software in the web-site to call the particular site that is indicated. Thus, the site is indeed a site in the literal sense, being
located in a particular computer, which is located in some state or country. Other
terms used in reference to a web-site are "web-page" and "bulletin board." See id.
5. This fact is what distinguishes this Comment from Zembeck. Cf.Zembeck,
supra note 3. The Zembeck article uses hypothetical model scenarios to exemplify
how personal jurisdiction should be analyzed. While this method is useful, it does not
take into account the various forum-specific precedents that courts use in analyzing
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well as the United States Supreme Court, have dealt with the issue of

obtaining jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who has done
nothing more than launch an injurious writing into the stream of com-

merce.6 And, as the Internet expands, 7 so too will the need for a co-

herent method of maintaining personal jurisdiction over a web-site
that has injured someone in Texas. 8 By elucidating the physical nature
of the Internet as an extension of present technology and not something fundamentally new, courts will realize that the present law of
jurisdictional analysis is perfectly adequate. No fundamental changes
are needed in the law to show that a nonresident creator/owner of a
web site can be haled into a Texas court.
What makes the Internet seem so formidable lies in part in some of
the rhetoric surrounding it.9 Information on the Internet is not in the
mythical realm popularly called "Cyberspace," 10 but magnetic etch-

situations. This Comment is more specific in that it relies on Texas court precedent in
modeling how web-site jurisdiction should be analyzed in Texas.
6. The best example of this in Texas is Jetco Electronic Industries v. Gardiner,325
F. Supp. 80 (S.D. Tex. 1971). For a discussion of this case see infra Part II.B.1. The
best examples of this fact situation from the United States Supreme Court are Calder
v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), and Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
For a discussion of these cases see infra Part I.B.1-2.
7. Recent reports show that the explosion of Internet use has nearly halted normal telephone use due to the dual sharing of Internet users and regular telephone
communications. See CBS Evening News (CBS television broadcast, December 18,
1996). There are about 1500 Internet providers nationwide. See Kara Swisher, As
Internet Grows, So Do Interests of Trade Groups, THE WASHINGTON POST, June 17,
1996, at F12. Internet usage is growing at an annual rate of 341,634%, and every 10
minutes a new network is connected to the Internet. See Michael Schrage, For Time's
'Man of the Year;' Consider the Incredible Internet, THE WASHINGTON POST, December 24, 1993, at D1O. In 1996, over 9,400,000 host computers were linked to the Internet. See American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Pa.
1996), affd, 117 S.Ct. 2329 (1997).
8. Injuries can arise from contract actions or tort actions on the Internet. See
Elliot E. Polebaum, Procedural Issues, in INTERNET AND ONLINE LAW § 10.02[2]
(Kent D. Stuckey ed., 1996). Such torts as fraud, defamation and tortious interference will be common on the Internet. See id. Specifically, trademark and copyright
infringement have been the most common types of suits to date. See infra Part III.
9. The confusion surrounding the Internet is highlighted in a recent comment by
the three-judge panel of the District Court in American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno:
The Internet is not a physical or tangible entity, but rather a giant network
which interconnects innumerable smaller groups of linked computer networks. It is thus a network of networks ....The nature of the Internet is
such that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to determine its size at a given
moment.
929 F. Supp. at 830-31 (emphasis added). While this statement may be accurate in
that the Internet is not a physical or tangible entity, it must be understood that the
information on the Internet is located at a physical and tangible place-a computer
located in some state and under the control of a person or entity.
10. The term "cyberspace" was coined by the science fiction author William Gibson in Neuromancer. See WILLIAM GIBSON, NEUROMANCER (1984).
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ings on a solid disk.'1 These disks are located on computers (servers),
and these computers are located in some forum. Likewise, the person
at the other end-the user sitting at her desk "surfing the net"-is
merely commanding her computer software 2 to call the modem of a
computer in that forum through means of telephone lines.' 3 Above

all, it is vital to understand this: Telephone communication is not an
analogy to Internet communication, the Internet is telephone communication. The term "Cyberspace," invoked to make the Internet

sound like something fundamentally new, is best left to the world
from which it came-science fiction. 4
Perhaps the most unique feature of the Internet, and the one most
confusing, is the fact that the Internet can act in both an interactive
and passive capacity. Newspaper and magazine print, on the one
hand, are clearly passive. Once it is printed and mailed or delivered
by the publisher, the receiver cannot interact with this print to communicate directly with, for example, its creator. On the other hand,
the telephone is almost exclusively interactive. Most often, the telephone is used in an interactive capacity in that it takes an affirmative
act by two people to operate it. However, when coupled to a computer, telephone communication has the ability to take on a passive
role, just as newsprint. 5 And therein lies the problem.
The Internet incorporates both aspects of communication so that it

can be passive at one extreme and interactive at the other extreme.
The interactive extreme occurs in situations where there is two-way
communication between a user and the owner of a web-site through
either the computer itself or the phone or mail. 6 Determining

whether or not a court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant in
11. These magnetic etchings ultimately reside on what is called a "hard-drive,"
which is a magnetic storage device built into most computers. It is the computer operating system that translates these etchings into a readable format.
12. Netscape and America Online are two of the more popular software packages
commonly referred to as "browsers."
13. The computers at each end of the line transmit and translate the data through
the use of a modem, much like the mouthpiece of a telephone transmits and translates
a voice into electronic signals. See The Web, supra note 2.
14. See supra note 10.
15. Thus, a computer has the potential of acting as a passive newspaper or magazine in that the user can contact a web-site through the telephone lines. Instead of
interacting with another person which must make an affirmative action to respond to
the user, the web-site is a passive magnetic signal on the hard drive of a computer
which can simply be read like a newspaper.
16. See, e.g., Compuserve Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996) (acquiring
jurisdiction over the defendant through the language of the contract which stated that
the agreement is governed by the law of Ohio, and the many transmissions of information directed from the Texas defendant to the Ohio plaintiff were made over the
Internet in three year period); Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., 939
F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (jurisdiction over the defendant in its actions of responding to user inquiries for access to its service and receiving payments- for those
services); Zippo Mfr. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., No. 96-397, 952 F. Supp 1119 (W.D.
Pa. 1997) (finding that the injury to the plaintiff arose from the repeated Internet
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these cases should become simpler as the interactions accumulate. 17
This Comment, however, focuses on the most challenging aspect of
the Internet for purposes of personal jurisdiction-its passive
capacity.
To date, there are several cases from other jurisdictions that can be
classified as falling into the category of "passive" web-site cases18 and
one case that falls somewhere near the passive end of the continuum
between passive and interactive fact patterns.' 9 Considering that
courts in other states will rely on their own precedent,2" it would be
confusing for a Texas court to base its analysis of personal jurisdiction
on any of these cases. While a discussion of the analytical pros and
cons of these cases is insightful, a discussion of Texas precedent would
be of more use when web-site cases arise.
When the nonresident defendant's contacts with Texas are as tenuous as they are bound to be in the case of passive web-sites, personal
jurisdictional analysis becomes critical. Central to the court's analysis
is the nexus between the actions of the defendant in making the website and the injury caused to a Texas resident. This Comment shows

that the nexus is formed by finding some degree of intent in the defendant's actions. This "intent" has been variously described by such

terms as "foreseeability,"' "purpose," 2 2 "knowledge," 2 3 and other
terms by various courts. A refinement of this issue is vital in defining
courts may obtain personal jurisdiction over web-site
how Texas
24
owners.

activities through the use of the plaintiff's trademark and that the defendant consciously chose to process applications from the plaintiffs forum).
17. This fact was recognized in the recent decision in Zippo, when the court made
an effort to categorize Internet related cases by their level of passivity or interactivity.
See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124. This Comment focuses on cases that fall mostly into
the "passive" category, although in reality the cases present a continuum of fact patterns between the extremes. The focus on passive web-sites is due to the inherent
difficulty in that analysis, since the lack of activity between plaintiff and defendant
makes the due process reach of the state more tenuous.
18. See infra Part III.A.-B.1.
19. See infra Part III.B.2.
20. See DAVID CRUMP ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE 82,
90 (2d ed. 1992). ("Each state has one or more 'long-arm' statutes. The reach of long
arm jurisdiction depends upon the traditions and values of the people of the state, as
expressed by its legislature in its long-arm statute. [E]very state's statutes are subject
to interpretation by the courts of that state.").
21. See cases cited infra note 89.
22. See cases cited infra note 92.
23. Memorial Hosp. Sys. v. Fisher Ins. Agency, Inc., 835 S.W.2d 645, 651 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied) The defendant knew that the information he provided would be used in forum state; therefore, the court found defendant
had purposefully availed himself of the forum law.
24. For more on the legal ramifications of creating and owning a web-site, see
Thomas J. Smedinghoff, From Web Sites to Online Sales: A Road Map to the Legal
Issues, in ONLINE LAW, THE SPA's LEGAL GUIDE TO DOING BUSINESS ON THE INTERNET § 2 (Thomas J. Smedinghoff ed., 1996).
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This Comment sets forth the analysis that Texas courts should use in
maintaining personal jurisdiction over the nonresident creator/owner
of a web-site on the Internet. This will be accomplished by elucidating
the nature of the Internet in such a way as to show that its inherent
nature is not unlike fact situations that Texas courts have dealt with
previously. First, the foundation of jurisdictional analysis is outlined,
concluding that for web-site cases jurisdiction hinges upon the intent
or purpose in the web-site owner's actions. Second, significant Texas
cases are discussed to explore the exact nature of what a court must
find to properly maintain personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant when injuries arise from printed material and/or wire communications. Finally, cases from other states that analyze web-site
personal jurisdiction are compared and contrasted with the analysis of
Texas courts. This Comment concludes that, when the injury claimed
arises from the web-site itself, the Texas court can maintain personal
jurisdiction if the proper nexus between the defendant's actions and
the alleged injury is established.
I.

LONG-ARM STATUTE AND DUE PROCESS LIMITS OF PERSONAL
JURISDICTION IN TEXAS

A.

The Texas Test

Both state2 5 and federal2 6 courts in Texas must establish that personal jurisdiction exists over nonresident defendants before the merits
are tried.2 7 The Fifth Circuit has determined that it must use the same
analysis as Texas state courts use in acquiring personal jurisdiction.2 8
This analysis is based on the Texas long-arm statute 29 and federal constitutional due process 30 requirements. 31 The long-arm statute requires that the defendant must have conducted business in this state,
defined as either contracting with or recruiting a Texas resident, committing a tort in the state or committing "other acts" that may be con25. See O'Brien v. Lanpar Co., 399 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Tex. 1966) (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).
26. See Bullion v. Gillespie, 895 F.2d 213, 215 (5th Cir. 1990).
27. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 120(a)(2); Portland Sav. & Loan v. Bernstein, 716 S.W.2d
532, 536 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("When reaching a decision to exercise or decline jurisdiction, the trial court should rely only upon the necessary jurisdictional facts and should not reach the merits of the case."); D.J. Inv., Inc.,
v. Metzeler Motorcycle Tire Agent Gregg, Inc., 754 F.2d 542, 543 (5th Cir. 1985) (stating that only a prima facie showing is necessary to show that the court has personal
jurisdiction over nonresident defendant).
28. See Bullion, 895 F.2d at 215. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A).
29. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.041-17.069 (Vernon 1995).
30. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 cl. 3. The first United States Supreme Court
case to interpret the Due Process Clause as limiting a state's ability to maintain in
personam, or personal, jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant was Pennoyer v.
Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), which held that in order to hale a nonresident defendant into
the state court the defendant must be served personally within the state.
31. See Schlobohm v. Schapiro, 784 S.W.2d 355, 356 (Tex. 1990).
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sidered doing business in the state.32 The Texas long-arm statute
places no limits on the mode of communication or injury-it may be
made "by mail or otherwise."3 3
The Texas long-arm statute has been interpreted by the Texas
Supreme Court as extending to the limits of due process. 34 For this
reason, the long-arm statute is interpreted broadly by the Texas
Supreme Court as to what constitutes "doing business" in Texas, placing the limits of due process at the center of personal jurisdiction anal36
ysis. 35 The Texas Supreme Court in Schlobohm v. Schapiro has
combined the Texas long-arm statute and federal due process requirements for personal jurisdiction into a three-part inquiry for specific
38
37
and general minimum contacts and fairness called the Texas Test:
1. The nonresident defendant or foreign corporation must purposefully do some act or consummate some transaction in the
forum state;
2. The cause of action must arise from, or be connected with, such
act or transaction. Even if the cause of action does not arise
from a specific contact, jurisdiction may be exercised if the defendant's contacts with Texas are continuing and systematic;
and
3. The assumption of jurisdiction by the forum state must not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, consideration being given to the quality, nature, and extent of the
activity in the forum state, the relative convenience of the parties, the benefits and protection of the laws of the forum state
afforded the respective parties, and the basic equities of the
39

A party is subject to being haled into Texas court when this test is
satisfied.4 ° Since the Texas Supreme Court has stated it is unlikely the
32. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM.

CODE ANN.

§ 17.042 (Vernon 1995).

33. Id.
34. See Schlobohm, 784 S.W.2d at 357. See also Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance
v. English China Clays, P.L.C., 815 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991); U-Anchor Adver.,
Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Tex. 1977).
35. See Schlobohm, 784 S.W.2d at 357.
36. 784 S.W.2d 355.
37. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). See
Guardian Royal Exch., 815 S.W.2d at 230 ("First, the nonresident defendant must
have purposefully established 'minimum contacts' with Texas. There must be a 'substantial connection' between the nonresident defendant and Texas arising from action
or conduct of the nonresident defendant purposefully directed toward Texas.") (footnotes omitted).
38. See InternationalShoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316 (exercising of jurisdiction must
comport with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" (quoting Millikin v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940))). See also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
471 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1985).
39. Schlobohm, 784 S.W.2d at 358. Part (1) and (2) refer to "minimum contacts,"
while part (3) refers to the finding of "fair play and substantial justice."
40. See id.
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parts (1) and (2) will

most always control personal jurisdictional analysis.4 2 In particular,
maintaining
personal jurisdiction depends on the court's finding of a
"nexus" 43 between the first and second parts of the test. Throughout
this Comment, the facts and analysis of the cases discussed centers on
the first two elements of the Texas Test, showing how the defendant's
actions are purposefully connected to Texas.
B.

Tools to Analyze Specific Fact Patterns

If a Texas court seeks jurisdiction over the creator of a web-site, the
legal analysis must center around the Texas Test. This is true regardless of the specific fact pattern or the specific means of communication.4 4 In this regard, the Internet is not distinguishable from any
other medium of communication. In fact, it has been recently recognized in Texas "[t]hat... information.., sent over the phone does not
prevent jurisdiction."4 5 Yet, it is tempting to see web-sites as different
from other mail or wire forms of communication. This is because people are once removed from the communication medium by the
modem/computer interface while using the Internet. Regardless of
whether communication occurs directly by phone or mediated by
computers through the Internet, there must be some action on the
part of the defendant. And it is this action that is vital to finding personal jurisdiction over nonresident owners of web-sites.
As communication technology made non-physical contacts between
states ever more present, the United States Supreme Court has recog41. See id.
42. See id. The "Texas Test" has evolved since the Texas Supreme Court first devised a three-prong test in O'Brien v. LanparCo., 399 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. 1966). It has
not changed substantively since then and is currently used in both federal and state
courts in Texas. The version of the "Texas Test" quoted above was revised only recently in Schlobohm, 784 S.W.2d at 358, to incorporate the elements of general jurisdiction in part (2), which was already used in Texas courts but not formally
incorporated into the test for specific personal jurisdiction.
43. Justice Pope, who wrote the dissenting opinion in Hall v. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A., 68 S.W.2d 870, 877 (Tex. 1982), rev'd, 466 U.S. 408 (1984), and
with whom the United States Supreme Court agreed, stated that the Texas long-arm
statute required that a "nexus" be formed between the injury alleged and the defendant's contacts with the state in order to maintain personal jurisdiction. Incidentally, it
was Justice Pope who wrote the majority opinion in O'Brien v. Lanpar Co., 399
S.W.2d 340 (Tex. 1966), which created the precursor to the current Texas Test outlined
supra, text accompanying note 39.
44. See TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.042 (Vernon 1995). "In addition to other acts that may constitute doing business, a nonresident does business in

this state if the nonresident: (1) contracts by mail or otherwise with a Texas resident."
Id. (emphasis added).

45. Memorial Hosp. Sys. v. Fisher Ins. Agency, Inc., 835 S.W.2d 645, 651 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ).
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nized that the limits of due process must remain flexible.4 6 As stated
by the Supreme Court in Hanson v. Denkla,47
As technological progress has increased the flow of commerce between States, the need for jurisdiction over nonresidents has undergone a similar increase. At the same time, progress in
communications and transportation has made the defense of a suit
in a foreign tribunal less burdensome. In response to these changes,
the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have
evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, to the flexible standard of InternationalShoe v. Washington.48
Yet, there is still a fundamental limitation on personal jurisdiction in
the Due Process Clause, and states may not make judgments against a
nonresident individual or corporation who has "no contacts, ties, or
relations" with the forum state. 49 Thus, the act of creating a web-site
and placing it on a server computer ° must be analyzed within the
same due process limitation on personal jurisdiction as the Supreme
Court has always recognized.
The physical presence of a defendant in the forum state is not
needed in order for a court to obtain personal jurisdiction.51 This will
most often be the case in a web-site which is contacted from one state
to another via telephone lines. The Supreme Court has acknowledged
that the modern trend in communications through "mail and wire
communications across state lines ... obviates the need for physical
presence."52 However, this does not preclude defendants from "purposefully directing" their actions at a particular forum.53
To determine the purposeful direction of a defendant's actions,
courts have used a flexible analysis for each case.54 With web-site
cases, as with all cases, 55 the court must not lose sight of the relation46. See Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 250-51 (citations omitted).
49. See id.
50. See The Web, supra note 2. Often, this act is referred to as placing a web-site
on the Internet. This is misleading, for the Internet is not a place. The only "place" in
this regard is the location of the server computer. This is an issue in Pres-Kap, Inc. v.
System One, Direct Access Inc., 636 So. 2d 1351 (Fla.Dist. Ct. App. 1994), discussed
infra Part III.A.
51. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985).
52. Id.
53. See id.
54. See Schlobohm v. Schapiro, 784 S.W.2d 355, 358 (Tex. 1990) (rejecting
mechanical application of any test, including the Texas Test).
55. See, e.g., Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance v. English China Clays, P.L.C., 815
S.W.2d 223, 230 (Tex. 1991) ("There must be a 'substantial connection' between the
nonresident defendant and Texas arising from action or conduct of the nonresident
defendant purposefully directed towards Texas."); Portland Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Bernstein, 716 S.W.2d 532, 537 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(finding the necessary nexus between the nonresident defendant's calls, letters, and
visit to Texas and the injury).
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ship between the injury in the forum and the nonresident defendant's
actions. A plaintiff cannot claim that personal jurisdiction exists over
a nonresident defendant due to the plaintiff's unilateral actions.56 According to the Texas Supreme Court, minimum contacts exist between
the forum and defendant when he purposefully avails himself through
his conduct." To find the nexus between the forum and the defendant's actions, the court must "focus upon his intentionalactivities and
expectations."58

The defendant's "expectations," as the Texas Supreme Court defines it, parallels the United States Supreme Court's "foreseeability"
language:
[T]he foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the
mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum state.
Rather, it is that [1] the defendant's conduct and [2] connection with
the forum state are such that he should reasonably anticipate being
haled into court there.59
Foreseeability alone, however, is never enough.6 ° The specific facts of
the case must be carefully analyzed to form the nexus between the
actor's intent and his actions.6 ' It is then that a defendant's actions
are purposefully directed.
Satisfying the minimum contacts requirements for due process becomes increasingly difficult as the nexus between the defendant's actions and the injury in the forum become attenuated. This will most
certainly be the case in many web-site cases, where the only action of
the defendant who owns a web-site is its creation and placement on a
server computer. But, once this act is completed, the web-site may be
analogized to a nationally circulated magazine that is placed in stores
or a magazine subscription placed in mailboxes.62
Once the web-site is placed on the server computer, how is personal
jurisdiction maintained over the nonresident defendant? In these situations, two well known models can be used to break down fact patterns into their important elements.63 Although a purely artificial
creation, these models are helpful in analyzing personal jurisdiction
56. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 417
(1984).
57. See Schlobohm, 784 S.W.2d at 357.
58. Id. (emphasis added).
59. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (emphasis added) (citing Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 97-98 (1978); Shaffer v.-Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977)). See also Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474
(1985).
60. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 287.
61. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 110-11 (1987).
Accord Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance v. English China Clays, P.L.C., 815 S.W.2d
223, 230 (Tex. 1991).
62. See infra Part I.C.
63. See W. Frank Newton & Jeremy C. Wicker, PersonalJurisdictionand the Appearance to Challenge Jurisdictionin Texas, 38 BAYLOR L. REV. 491, 535 (1986).
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over passive web-sites used to solicit business or advertise a product. 64
Using this approach, the two most helpful models are the "Stream of
Commerce" and "Tort Effects" models.65
1. Stream of Commerce-Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.

The Stream of Commerce model is exemplified by the Supreme
Court case Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.6 6 The Stream of Com-

merce model applies when (a) a defendant delivers a product into the
stream of interstate commercial activity, (b) the defendant acts with
the expectation that the product will be used or purchased by someone

in the forum state, (c) someone in the forum state does use or

purchase the product, and (d) the product causes injury. 67 The "product" can be tangible as well as intangible. 68 For instance, the harmful

product in Keeton was an intangible article written for a publication
that is circulated nationally.69 There, the Court found that the nonresident defendant "continuously and deliberately exploited"7 0 the fo-

rum market (satisfying (a) and (b) in the Stream of Commerce test),
and that the plaintiff was injured as a result of the defendant's activities (satisfying (c) and (d)). Thus, the defendant could reasonably anticipate being haled into court in the forum. 7 ' The defendant's
expectation or foreseeability in this instance arose from the defendant's
knowledge that the publication entered the forum state.72
64. In this regard, the models outlined by Newton & Wicker, supra note 63, are
more relevant than the models used by Zembeck, supra note 3, in that they are based
on actual cases, while the Zembeck models are theoretical in nature. Furthermore,
Newton & Wicker is a Texas-specific article, focusing on Texas precedent. See
Newton & Wicker, supra note 63, at 537-77.
65. See Newton & Wicker, supra note 63, at 535-36.
66. 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
67. See Newton & Wicker, supra note 63, at 535.
68. See id. at 539 (citing Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343 (1942)). See
also Thomas J. Smedinghoff, Understanding Electronic Property Rights, in

ONLINE

SPA's LEGAL GUIDE TO DOING BUSINESS ON THE INTERNET § 8 (Thomas
J. Smedinghoff, ed., 1996) (citing that property rights to information on the Internet
includes the right to control access to and copying of that information).
69. See Keeton, 465 U.S. at 772. The national publication is "Hustler" magazine,
and 10,000 to 15,000 residents of New York receive the magazine. See id. The Court
does not state if these magazines are directed at individual residents via mail, or if
they are simply sold in stores, the latter arguably being less directed. This distinction,
if made, is comparable to the facts highlighted in Maritz v. Cybergold, 947 F. Supp.
1328, 1333 (E.D. Mo. 1996), where 12,000 residents in Missouri have access to the
Internet-less directed action by defendant-and 311 residents of Missouri have actually received communications from the defendant (more directed action). See infra
Part III.B.2.
70. See Keeton, 465 U.S. at 781 (citing World-Wide Volkswagon v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286 (1980)).
71. See id.
72. See id. ("[S]ince respondent can be charged with knowledge [that his actions
in publishing the article could cause harm in another forum], it must anticipate that
such a suit will seek nationwide damages.").
LAW, THE
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To obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendant, it would not
have been enough for the defendant to foresee that its publication
might enter the forum. This was elucidated in World-Wide Volk-

swagen v. Woodson,73 where the plaintiff claimed a car dealership in

New York could foresee the possibility a car it sold in New York
would enter another state and cause injury. But, the Court found that
the car dealer's action of selling a car to someone in New York was
too attenuated an act to hail the New York defendant into Oklahoma,
where the plaintiff was injured by the car.74 The defendant must make
a deliberate act to get the injurious product into the forum state. 75 The
Court in Keeton found that the defendant's actions were deliberate,
thus satisfying due process. 76 It does not matter that the product enters other forums or causes or does not cause injury in other forums. 77
What is important in terms of maintaining personal jurisdiction is the
defendant's intent which forms the nexus between her actions and the
injury in the forum.
2. Tort Effects-Calder v. Jones
The Tort Effects model is exemplified by the United States
Supreme Court in Calder v. Jones.78 The Tort Effects model applies

when the defendant intentionally inflicts injury on a resident of the
forum state.79 The Calder case, as the Keeton case, also involved libel
from a national publication.8 ° In Calder, a California actress sued the
Florida authors for an article that was circulated nationwide.8" The
Court upheld personal jurisdiction in California by finding the defendants had intentionally targeted California with the article since they
knew the article could be potentially devastating to the actress.82 The
Court found the defendant's actions were "intentional . . . and ex-

pressly aimed at California."83 The fact that the actress lived in California was not a random occurrence or unilateral act on her part.
Thus, the Court found that the defendants could "reasonably anticipate being haled into the California court."'
73. 444 U.S. 286, 295-96 (1980).
74. See id.

75. See Keeton, 465 U.S. at 781.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 780-81. Indeed, the Court in Keeton acknowledged that it is out-ofstate where the bulk of injury in a libel action will ensue with a nationally circulated

writing. See id.
78. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
79. See Newton & Wicker, supra note 63, at 535-36.
80. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 784-85 (1984).

81. See id.
82. See id. at 789-90.

83. Id. at 789.
84. Id. at 790 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,

297 (1980)).
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The facts in Calder are similar to those in Keeton; both involved

libelous writings in nationally published magazines and a single injury
that arose from its publication. These magazines have no directional
aspect since they are not directed to any one state but are distributed
throughout the states depending on the market for them.8 6 The common, ground that both opinions find is in the defendant's intent to
cause injury within the forum. This is true of libel as well as other
torts of an intangible nature such as trademark violations. In cases
such as these, purposeful availment that rises to the level of minimum
contacts is grounded in the following critical language of the United
States Supreme Court:
The "substantial connection[ ]" between the defendant and the forum State necessary for a finding of minimum contacts must come
about by an action of the defendant purposefully directed toward
the forum State. The placement of a product into the stream of
commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State. Additional conduct of the
defendant may indicate an intent or purpose to serve the market in
the forum State ....[A] defendant's awareness that the stream of
commerce may or will sweep the product into the forum State does
not convert the mere act of placing the product into the stream into
an act purposefully directed toward the forum state.8 7
Although a defendant might foresee that its product, writing, or
unique mark will travel to other states and cause an injury in another
state, this foreseeability alone is not enough to satisfy the due process
requirement. The defendant's conduct must indicate some "intent or
purpose."8 8 Hence, there must be a nexus between the defendant's
underlying actions and her intent or purpose to find that the defendant directed her actions at a particular forum.
A finding of purposeful availment between the defendant's actions
and the injury in the forum is often obfuscated by the various use of
"nexus" words such as "foreseeability," 9 "awareness," 9° "expecta85. In Calder, the actress, Shirley Jones, sued the NationalEnquirer for distributing an article that she claimed invaded her privacy and inflicted emotional harm. See
id. at 785.
86. Of course, individuals may also subscribe to the magazine, thus making the
magazine more directional. But the Court in Keeton and Calder make no mention of
this directionality in their analysis of the cases, instead focusing on the randomness of
the magazine's distribution throughout the United States. See Keeton, 465 U.S. at 770
("Respondent's contacts with [the forum] consist of monthly sales of some 10,000 to
15,000 copies of its nationally published magazine."); Calder, 465 U.S. at 784 ("The
article was published in a national magazine with a large circulation in California.").
87. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (alteration
in original) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
88. Id.
89. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980) ("Yet
'foreseeability' alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction
under the Due Process Clause."); Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance v. English China
Clays, P.L.C., 815 S.W.2d 223, 227 (Tex. 1991) ("Although not an independent com-
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But it is the gray area between

"foreseeability" and "intention" that Texas courts often tread when
maintaining personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. In
fact, the Texas Supreme Court in Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance v. English China Clays, P.L.C.94 suggests that various nexus standards are necessary and dependent upon the exact fact situation.95
Further, the Fifth Circuit in Prejean v. Sonatrach, Inc.9 6 states that

purposeful availment will depend, among other things, on "the existence and degree of purposefulness with which the effect in that forum
was created." 97 Thus, the language that the court uses to describe the
defendant's intentions in his actions will depend upon the specific
facts of the case.
ponent of the minimum contacts analysis, the concept of 'foreseeability' is implicit in
the requirement that there be a 'substantial connection' between the nonresident defendant and Texas arising from action or conduct of the nonresident defendant purposefully directed toward Texas.").
90. Guardian Royal Exch., 815 S.W.2d at 227 ("'Foreseeability' was based upon
the insurer's awareness .... ").
91. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298 (stating that products delivered into
stream of commerce with "expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in
the forum state"); Jetco Elec. Indus., Inc. v. Gardiner, 325 F. Supp. 80, 84 (S.D. Tex.
1971) ("Here, the defendant contends that he did not specifically intend to advertise
in Texas. But the fact of the matter is that not only could he reasonably expect that
his advertisements would be read by Texas citizens, but the very purpose of the advertisements was to entice potential customers ....
"); Schlobohm v. Schapiro, 784
S.W.2d 355, 357 (Tex. 1990) (finding that the court must "focus upon [defendant's]
intentional activities and expectations in deciding whether it is proper to call him
before the courts of the forum"); Newton & Wicker, supra note 63, at 535. See also
Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761 (I11.1961).
92. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) ("Additional conduct of the defendant may indicate an intent or purpose to serve the market
in the forum State .... "); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 (1985)
("We have noted several reasons why a forum legitimately may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who 'purposefully directs' his activities toward forum
residents."); Jetco, 325 S.W.2d at 84 (purpose of the advertisements).
93. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112 (intent or purpose); Schlobohm, 784 S.W.2d at 357
(stating that the court must "focus upon [defendant's] intentional activities and expectations in deciding whether it is proper to call him before the courts of the forum").
94. 815 S.W.2d 223, 227 (Tex. 1991) (suggesting that "foreseeability" is appropriate in insurance cases in describing the nexus).
95. See id.
96. 652 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1981).
97. Id. at 1269 (emphasis added) (listing three factors to determine purposeful
availment of the nonresident defendant: (1) existence and degree, (2) other substantial contacts, and (3) magnitude of the injury itself). The court in Prejean stated:
Purposeful creation is strongest when the defendant intended the impact to
be felt in the forum. It is also present, as in the 'stream of commerce' cases,
when the defendant can reasonably expect the effect to localize itself in the
forum. The expectation is stronger when the defendant establishes or relies
on a marketing distribution system that serves the forum than when the defendant merely introduces his products into the general currents of
commerce.
Id. at 1269 n.18 (citations omitted). The court also cites Jetco approvingly. See Jetco
Elec. Indus. v. Gardiner, 325 F. Supp. 80 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
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Who's Crossing State Lines-The Web-Site Owner or the
Internet User?

The fundamental problem with personal jurisdiction on the Internet
is discerning whose action places the web-site into the stream of commerce, or more specifically, into Texas. 98 Whether using the Stream of
Commerce or Tort Effects model, it is assumed that the writing is
either specifically directed at the plaintiff's forum, or there is some
intent to cause injury to a person in the forum through its random
distribution. This is simple to visualize with, for instance, the National

Enquirer99 or Hustler Magazine,"°° both of which have national distribution that is initiated by the owner or publisher of those publications.

In the case of web-sites, the only act of the defendant is to create the
web-site and place it onto a server computer. 10 1 The user is the one

that calls up the web-site that resides on a server computer.' 0 2 As
mentioned previously, 0 3 and a fact that is often misunderstood about
the Internet in other cases, 10 4 web-sites do not "float" in some sort of
"Cyberspace"' 1 5 or "electronic location"'0 6 that is indeterminable.

Web-sites are at a physical location that must be accessed by an affirmative act on the part of the user. Until this fact is dealt with, ob98. Fortunately, some other commentators have recognized this fundamental
problem. See Perritt, supra note 3, at 19-25. However, other commentators see the
problem differently. See David L. Stott, Comment, Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: The ConstitutionalBoundary of Minimum Contacts Limited to a Web Site, 15 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 819, 840 (1997) (stating that "[b]y nature, once
information is posted on the Internet, that information is instantly in the stream of
commerce on a world-wide basis"). The analysis of the personal jurisdiction problem
taken in this Comment is inconsistent with the approach taken by Stott.
99. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 785 (1984).
100. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 772 (1984).
101. See The Web, supra note 2.
102. See id.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 2-13.
104. See, e.g., Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn.
1996) (finding that the defendant had purposefully directed its advertising at the forum and all states merely by placing its web-site on the Internet); Panavision Int'l,
L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616, 621 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (finding, through the merits of
the case, that the defendant had expressly aimed its conduct at the forum by inferring
an intent to interfere with plaintiff's business); Minnesota v. Granite Gate Resorts,
Inc., No. C6-95-7227, 1996 WL 767431, at *6-*7 (D. Minn. Dec. 11, 1996), aff'd, 1997
WL 557670 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 1997) (finding that the placement of a web-site
"onto" the Internet and its continuous availability availed its owner of the forum).
105. See supra note 10. See also David Bender, Emerging Personal Jurisdictional
Issues on the Internet,7, 17 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Property
Course Handbook Series No. 64-3961, 1996), available in Westlaw, 453 PLI/Pat 7
("Transactions using the Internet occur in cyberspace."); Dan L. Burk, Federalism In
Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1095, 1096-99 (1996) (speaking of multi-jurisdictional
regulation of the Internet as a problem due to its nebulous boundaries in cyberspace
and the "cybernauts" that "inhabit" it).
106. Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One, Direct Access, Inc., 636 So. 2d 1351, 1353 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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taining personal jurisdiction over web-sites will certainly be an
inaccurate and unfair ordeal.
Courts that have dealt with the issue of web-site jurisdiction to date
have, for the most part, simply held that the owner of a web-site who
places it onto "the Internet" has "purposefully availed" himself of the
forum. 10 7 However, this act alone by the creator/owner is not enough
without some analysis of the owner's intent or purpose in his actions.
Thus, the purpose or intent in these actions is the critical factor in
finding the nexus necessary to acquire personal jurisdiction over websites. In Texas, there are two basic considerations that can assist in
finding that nexus.
First, the court in Memorial Hospital System v. Fisher Insurance
Agency'08 held that a single phone call initiated by the Texas plaintiff
was enough to maintain personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant. 10 9 Thus, the court found no problem with the fact that the
plaintiff initiated the contact. The key factor in the court's holding
may be that the plaintiff and defendant were acting in the course of
their business when the call was made. Specifically, the court stated
that when the plaintiff called the nonresident defendant inquiring
about business matters, the defendant "knew the call originated from
Texas and should have known that the information provided would be
relied upon by a Texas resident: therefore[,] who initiated the telephone call is not determinative in finding personal jurisdiction.""'
The same reasoning applies to Internet communication. If the intent
or purpose of the web-site owner is for residents of Texas to access its
web-site, and he knows that there are Internet users in Texas, then
Memorial Hospital may be reliable precedent for the maintenance of
personal jurisdiction over nonresident web-site owners. Thus, regardless of who initiates the wire contact with a web-site, personal jurisdiction can be acquired by Texas."'
107. See infra Part III.B.
108. 835 S.W.2d 645, 651 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (discussing suit for fraud and misrepresentation).
109. See id. Although California plaintiffs initiated contact, the court in California
Software Inc. v. Systems Technology Associate, Inc., 557 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1977), also
exerted personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant based on misrepresenta-

tions made over the telephone. See Data Disc, 557 F.2d at 1284-89. Although the
facts in Data Disc were in dispute, the court did not seem to be troubled by who
initiated the phone transactions.
110. Memorial Hosp., 835 S.W.2d at 651. But, in Brown v. Flowers Industries, Inc.,

688 F.2d 328 (5th Cir. 1982), a Mississippi case, the fact that the nonresident defendant initiated phone contact was important to the court for acquiring personal jurisdiction. This is in apparent conflict with the court in Memorial Hospital However,
Brown is a Mississippi case, thus not reliable precedent for Texas.
111. The only limitation on this general rule will depend on the type of action at

bar, whether tort or contract. In particular, in tort actions, Texas precedent suggests
that, if the plaintiff initiates the contact, the defendant must be acting within the scope
of its employment or normal business activities. See Memorial Hosp., 835 S.W.2d at
651 (indicating a strong nexus formed when defendant acts in the course of business
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Second, Internet access by individual users is controlled much like a

subscription ' to
a nationally circulated publication. Indeed, a user
"subscribes" 2 to an Internet provider such as America Online in
much the same way as people in California subscribed to the National
Enquirer in Calder v. Jones.11 3 The only difference is that, while the

company that distributes a magazine must physically deliver the publication to the subscriber, web-site owners only need to place their creation onto one server computer that will allow access by others who

must initiate contact. Internet subscribers must pay to access the information on the server just as magazine subscribers must pay for
magazines. The Internet server is like a conventional publisher of information that sends information only when the user, or customer,
demands it." 4 Thus, the question for both Internet and print publications that enter the forum and cause injury is whether the nonresident

defendant intended for the publication to enter the forum. 115 If the
court in Texas can find that the web-site owner knew that Internet
subscribers in Texas had access to their site and intended for the website to be accessed, then the court can properly maintain personal jurisdiction over the nonresident.
II.

PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN TEXAS CASES INVOLVING NO
PHYSICAL CONTACT WITH THE FORUM-PAPER OR
ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS

Texas cases dealing with printed publications that are launched into
the stream of commerce and create a tortious injury in the forum are
of precedential value in cases of web-site jurisdiction. The act of a
person going to the newsstand or mailbox to receive printed material
is identical to the act of receiving a wire transmission of a server-based
web-site on a computer screen through the user's act of commanding
the computer. Furthermore, Texas courts have clearly held that wire
in establishing jurisdiction); Wilson v. Belin, 20 F.3d 644, 649 (5th Cir. 1994) (denying
jurisdiction from statements made during the phone call initiated by plaintiff since the
defendants were not acting in the course of their normal business activities). Thus, a
finding of the web-site owner's intent and purpose in making the web-site and placing
it on a server is all the more vital.
112. See Perritt, supra note 3, at 19-20 (finding no valid distinction between subscription-based commercial systems such as America Online and print subscribers).
113. 465 U.S. 783, 785 (1984). This proposition is analogous to the subscription
process for commercial newspapers. See id.
114. See Perritt, supra note 3, at 21-22 (in accord with the view in this Comment).
However, Perritt goes on to make distinctions between certain hypothetical situations
where a web-site acts as an intermediary to another web-site and so forth. See Perritt,
supra note 3, at 23-25. These situations, while real and common, are abstractions of
the real problem. Regardless of how a user gets to a web-site, once he gets there, the
question still becomes one of defendant's acts, intentions, and the injury that arises
from these.
115. In this regard, Perritt and Zembeck are silent. See generally Perritt, supra note
3; Zembeck, supra note 3. These articles make no mention of the nexus that must be
found in the defendant's intent or purpose in his actions.
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communication is not distinguishable from print for purposes of personal jurisdiction.' 16

All of the web-site cases to date arise from injury caused by the
violation of a federally registered trademark. 1

7

In spite of the fact

that no Texas cases exist where jurisdiction arose from advertising that
violates a trademark,118 the commission of other torts is equally applicable. Hence, prior precedent is useful for future Texas Internet website cases. These cases should guide the court in finding the nexus
between (1) the actions of the defendant, and (2) the intention of the
defendant in the actions that caused the injury in Texas.
A.

No Minimum Contacts

1. When the Defendant's Actions are Insufficient for

Minimum Contacts
Nationally distributed advertising that finds its way into Texas does
not satisfy minimum contacts," 9 nor is it sufficient to satisfy the requirements for general jurisdiction. 20 Further, the court in Curry v.
116. See Memorial Hosp. Sys. v. Fisher Ins. Agency, Inc., 835 S.W.2d 645, 650-51
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
117. See infra Part III. See also Andrew R. Basile, Jr., Trademark Rights, in ONLINE LAW, THE SPA's LEGAL GUIDE TO DOING BUSINESS ON THE INTERNET 209,
210-11 (Thomas J. Smedinghoff ed., 1996) (finding that.trademark rights on the Internet include use of words and phrases, symbols and pictures, nicknames, and domain names).
118. The only two Texas cases dealing with trademark violations in which personal
jurisdiction was an issue are Hupp v. Siroflex of America, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 744 (S.D.
Tex. 1994), and Sinko v. St. Louis Music Supply Co., 603 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Tex.

1984). In both of these cases, the finding of minimum contacts rested upon the sale of
an item that violated a trademark or patent and not on advertising.
119. See Loumar, Inc. v. Smith, 698 F.2d 759, 764 (5th Cir. 1983) (advertising in
nationally circulated trade magazines, some or all of which may have been circulated
in the state of Texas); Curry v. Williams, 880 F. Supp. 487, 488 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (nationally circulated advertisement); Siskind v. Villa Found. For Educ., Inc., 642 S.W.2d
434, 437 (Tex. 1982) (relying on various interactions between nonresident and forum
and not the initial contact made with the plaintiff through nationally distributed advertising, implying that lone advertisement is not enough for personal jurisdiction);
Hayes v. Wissel, 882 S.W.2d 97, 98 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1994, no writ) (internationally circulated trade magazine advertisement and one phone call).
120. See Bounty-Full Entertainment, Inc. v. Forever Blue Entertainment Group,
Inc., 923 F. Supp. 950, 957 n.4 (S.D. Tex. 1996). The court in Wilkinson v. Carnival
Cruise Lines, Inc., 645 F. Supp. 318 (S.D. Tex. 1985), elucidates the exact nature of
this rule that advertising alone will not allow Texas courts to maintain jurisdiction
over nonresidents. In Wilkinson, the court held that advertising alone would not support personal jurisdiction. See id. at 321. However, in that case the nonresident defendants' cumulative actions of spending $1,150,000 in 1982 to 1984 on advertising in
Texas alone, and the existence of three local travel agents within the state that generated $21,000 in gross ticket revenues for the company, together created personal jurisdiction. See id. at 320-21. The actions of the defendant are so substantial when
compared to possible passive web-site scenarios that this case will not be discussed at
length in this Comment.
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Williams 2 ' states "that merely contracting with a resident of a forum
state is insufficient here to subject the nonresident to the forum's jurisdiction."' 2 2 There must be some affirmative act initiated by the defendant, either doing business or committing a tort, 2 3 that puts the
defendant on notice that he has availed himself to the protections of
the law in Texas. Thus, the claim of jurisdiction over a nonresident
will only be sustained from nationally distributed advertising where
the injury arises from the advertising itself.
Cases where the court found that the nonresident's activities are
12 4
insufficient for jurisdiction in Texas, such as Loumar, Inc. v. Smith
and Curry, 25 have fact patterns that lend themselves to possible website situations. In those cases, the nonresident defendants had distributed advertising throughout the country that elicited a response from
the Texas plaintiffs. However, in neither case did the cause of action-the injury-arise out of the advertising itself, thus not meeting
the requirements of specific personal jurisdiction. Further, the nonresident defendants had no offices in Texas, were not licensed to do
business in Texas, nor had any other continuous or systematic contacts
that would amount to general personal jurisdiction. This will most
often be the case in web-site situations where one party (the user)
connects to the Internet via his phone line and views a web-site which
is stored on a server computer in another forum. The user then accesses another site through a hyperlink126 seeking more information,
or to be contacted by the nonresident owner of the web-site directly.
The speed and ease of these actions may be greater than that of traditional person-to-person phone conversations, but this fact does not
distinguish web-site communication from the situation in Curry. Responding to a print advertisement using the telephone or mail is not
only analogous to web-site communication,' 27 it is identicalto Internet
communication. The web-site does not "reach out" to the user any
more than a print advertisement does. 2 8 It is only through the de121. 880 F. Supp. 487 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (finding that plaintiff was solicited through
defendant's nationally circulated advertisement and subsequently negotiated a contract to purchase defendant's business, claiming injury in defendant's later refusal to
follow through on the deal), affd, 49 F.3d 728 (5th Cir. 1995).
122. Id. at 489 (citing Colwell Realty Inv., Inc. v. Triple T Inns of Arizona, Inc., 785
F.2d 1330, 1334 (5th Cir. 1986)).
123. See id. See also TEX. CIV. PRAC.& REM. CODE ANN. § 17.042 (Vernon 1995).
124. 698 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1983).
125. Curry v. Williams, 880 F. Supp. 489 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
126. See supra note 4.
127. This is suggested in Zembeck, supra note 3.
128. See Byassee, supra note 3. In Byassee, the author analogizes web-sites to
products in a store in which the plaintiff must take the affirmative act of traveling
across state lines to purchase. See id. at 211. Thus, Byassee places the unilateral act
upon the resident plaintiff, not the nonresident defendant. But see supra Part I.C. for
an alternative view.
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fendant's intention or expectation to cause an injury that he can "purposefully avail" himself of an out-of-state forum.
Most cases involving web-sites will likely involve specific acts.
Hence, the analysis must focus on a finding of specific personal jurisdiction 129 as opposed to general personal jurisdiction. 30 The previous
cases analyze the specific acts of the parties in order to determine if

the Texas court can obtain specific personal jurisdiction over the defendants. While it will often be useful to argue that placing a web-site
on the Internet amounts to placing a writing in the stream of commerce, this argument should fail if it is used to argue that the court has
general personal jurisdiction over the defendant without some specific
act that harms the Texas plaintiff. 3 ' Like the Tort Effects pattern,
there must be a nexus between the thing
distributed and the harm
32
inflicted by the defendant in the forum.'
2. When The Defendant's Intent is Insufficient for
Minimum Contacts
The nexus between the first and second parts of the Texas Test is

completed through the defendant's purpose or intent. In this regard,
the Fifth Circuit in Wilson v. Belin13 3 exemplifies how the defendant's
intent is crucial in maintaining personal jurisdiction in cases where the
contacts of the defendant with the forum are tenuous, as will be the
case in web-sites. The analysis in the Wilson case closely parallels the
Supreme Court's analysis in Calder.' In Wilson, the plaintiff, a resident of Pennsylvania, sued reporters in Indiana and Iowa for defamation.'3 5 The plaintiff brought suit in Texas because the defamatory

articles written by the defendants concerned a speech that the plaintiff
made in Texas. 3 6
129. See Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance v. English China Clays, P.L.C., 815
S.W.2d 223, 227 (Tex. 1991) ("When specific jurisdiction is asserted, the cause of action must arise out of or relate to the nonresident defendant's contact with the forum
state .... ").
130. See id. at 228 ("General jurisdiction may not be asserted when the cause of
action does not arise from or relate to the nonresident defendant's purposeful conduct within the forum state but there are continuous and systematic contacts between
the nonresident defendant and the forum state.").
131. See id. Accord Schlobohm v. Schapiro, 784 S.W.2d 355, 357 (Tex. 1990).
132. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779-80 (1984).
133. 20 F.3d 644 (5th Cir. 1994).
134. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
135. See id. at 646.
136. See id. A Dallas Times Herald reporter who had attended a Dallas symposium, where the plaintiff gave a speech, telephoned the defendants, Belin and Blakey,
to discuss the plaintiff's comments in his speech. See id. As it turns out, Belin and
Blakey had some disparaging comments to make regarding the plaintiff's speech. See
id. Blakey was quoted as saying, "You know the saying among computer people,
'Garbage in, garbage out.'? This is garbage." Id. This statement was printed in the
Dallas newspaper, and the plaintiff instituted this lawsuit. See id.
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The Fifth Circuit uses the analysis 137 set out by the Texas Supreme
Court in Schlobohm in finding that there was no personal jurisdiction
over the nonresident defendant. 138 Relying on Calder, the plaintiff's
leading argument was that there were minimum contacts because the
defendants could reasonably foresee that their statements would be
published in Texas, thus causing the plaintiff injury to his reputation. 139 Unlike the situation in Calder, the publication in question in
Wilson was in fact more directed to the forum.140 The Calder case
dealt with the National Enquirer, a nationally circulated publication,
while the defamatory statements in Wilson were printed in a Dallas
newspaper which is arguably much more localized and directed to the
forum. But the court found that the plaintiff "reads Calder too
broadly."' 41
The Fifth Circuit in Wilson distinguishes Calder by looking carefully
at the actions and intentions of the defendants. The reporters, Blakey
and Belin, did no research in Texas, they did not get paid for their
comments, they were not acting as part of any business venture in
Texas, nor was there any indication that their unsolicited comments
were made to further their own careers. 42 Above all, the defendants
did not initiate the contacts. 4 3 Further, the plaintiff himself is not a
Texas resident, and his career was not centered there. The court also
alone is "not
finds that, while the tort did occur in Texas, this ' fact
44
dispositive of whether jurisdiction is appropriate.'
The Fifth Circuit expressly rejects the notion of pure foreseeability 45 as critical to acquiring personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. Although the court goes back to the Supreme Court's
somewhat circular definition of just what type of "foreseeability" is
relevant, the facts that appear dispositive to the court center upon the
actions and intentions of the defendants. The court found that the
defendants were not .acting in the course of their normal professional
activities and thus "took no planned action to inject themselves or
their opinions into the Texas forum.' 46 Thus, in fact situations as tenuous as when some writing or mark is deemed to cause an injury to a
resident in Texas, a finding of minimum contacts must center upon the
defendant's intent in his actions.
137. See id. at 647 n.4.
138. See id. at 648.
139. See id.
140. See Wilson v. Belin, 20 F.3d 644, 646 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing as important the
fact that the publication is a Dallas newspaper which may reach other states but is
largely targeted at Dallas and the immediately surrounding area).
141. Id. at 648.
142. See id.

143. See id. at 649.
144. Id. at 648 (citation omitted).
145. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
146. Wilson, 20 F.3d at 649.
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Even if contacts are greater than mere communication by wire or
paper, the defendant's actions and intentions will still be dispositive of
acquiring personal jurisdiction. Both the Stream of Commerce and
the Tort Effects models fail in cases like Wilson because there is no
indication of an injury intentionally directed at Texas. National advertising within the forum, without more, will not be sufficient to acquire
personal jurisdiction in Texas. The nonresident defendants must have
intended their actions to cause injury to avail themselves of Texas.
B.

Cases Finding Minimum Contacts Satisfying Due Process
1. Nationally Distributed Print Communication

When national, undirected advertising results in some specific injury within a forum, it is likely that the court can acquire personal
jurisdiction over the defendant who created the advertisement. In this
regard, Jetco Electronics Industries, Inc. v. Gardiner4 7 is the most important Texas case to date that is coextensive with likely web-site scenarios. The plaintiff, Gardiner, manufactured and sold metaldetectors to be used by hobbyists.' 48 The defendant, Jetco Electronic
Industries, was an Arizona manufacturer and purveryor of similar
items. The plaintiff alleged that he was injured by false statements
made by the defendant in his nationally circulated catalog. The catalogue made direct comparisons between the defendant's product and
a similar product made by the plaintiff. The plaintiff claimed that this
description was false and injurious and sought injunctive relief and
damages against the defendant.' 4 9
The court in Jetco found that the defendant had not targeted the
state of Texas in its publication of a catalogue. 150 Yet, the court found
that the Arizona defendant could be haled into Texas court. Specifically, the court stated that "[t]he injuries in this suit resulted because
defendant purposefully advertised in a national magazine. Consequently, the contacts defendant have with the State of Texas are integrally related to the plaintiff's cause of action."'151 The court in Jetco
found sufficient minimum contacts by looking at the nexus between
the contact made by the defendant's action (advertisement) and the
intent of the defendant (to make statements that could cause injury).
The court outlines the factors it used to determine minimum contacts:
1. The nature and the character of the business;
2. The number and type of activities within the forum;
3. Whether such activities give rise to the cause of action;
4. Whether the forum state has some special interest in granting
relief; and
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

325 F. Supp. 80 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
See id. at 82.
See id.
See id. at 82-83.
Id. at 83.
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5. The convenience of the parties.152

Although rarely worded as such by most courts, a common factor in
determining personal jurisdiction lies in the intent of the nonresident
defendant-were his actions calculated or intentional enough to be
directed at a particular forum so that he can expect to be haled into
that forum's courts? That the court in Jetco asked this central question is evident when comparing Jetco and Curry, two similar cases. In
comparing Jetco, where the court found personal jurisdiction existed
over an Arizona defendant, and Curry or Wilson, where the courts did
not find sufficient minimum contacts between the defendants and the
forum, the intent in the defendant's actions is the vital distinguishing
factor in determining whether the court's maintenance of personal jurisdiction over the defendant violates due process.
The Arizona corporation in Jetco was found to have purposefully
availed itself of Texas by its intentional action of comparing its products to those of the plaintiff and then deliberately distributing that
comparison in Texas and other forums. The court in Jetco states that
[h]ere, the defendant contends that he did not specifically intend to
advertise in Texas. But the fact of the matter is that not only could
he reasonably expect that his advertisements would be read by
Texas citizens, but the very purpose of the advertisements was to
they may be, not to do busientice potential customers, wherever
1 53
ness with the plaintiff in Texas.
Here, the terms "expect" and "very purpose" are interchangeable
with the word "intent." 154 It is a court's finding of intent in the defendant's actions which distinguishes the holdings in cases like Curry
and Jetco. Jetco should ultimately set the legal standard in Texas for
acquiring personal jurisdiction over nonresident web-site owners.
2.

Interactive Print and Wire Communication

Moving along the continuum of actions linking the defendant to the
forum are cases where several actions of interstate advertising and
phone contacts define personal jurisdiction. The Texas Supreme
Court in Siskind v. Sonatrach, Inc.1 55 bases personal jurisdiction on a
combination of interactions between the plaintiff and the nonresident
defendant involving both print advertising, letters, and phone communications. In Siskind, the Texas resident sued an Arizona resident for
breach of contract, claiming an exercise of personal jurisdiction over
the defendant due to its specific acts of business in Texas. 156 The de152. Id. (citing Hearne v. Dow Badische Chem. Co., 224 F. Supp. 90 (S.D. Tex.
1963)).
153. See id. at 84 (emphasis added).
154. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987). See also
supra text accompanying note 87.
155. 642 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. 1982).
156. See id. at 435.
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fendant operated a school in Arizona that she advertised in a national
publication. The plaintiff learned of the Arizona school through these
advertisements. As a result of the advertisements, the plaintiff called
the defendant, and the defendant responded by sending an informational packet through the mail to the plaintiff. The plaintiff later
signed a contract to enroll his son in the school. After one year of
school, the plaintiff signed a second contract for the following year.
The new contract was changed in that it deleted a provision providing
for Arizona being the exclusive forum to resolve any disputes, and it
also stated that tuition was non-refundable.' 5 7 Later that year, after
having signed the contract and enrolling his son in the defendant's
school, the son was expelled, and the plaintiff was unable to get a refund of his tuition. The plaintiff then sued the Arizona school for misrepresentation and breach of contract in Texas court.
The issue in Siskind was whether the Texas court could maintain
personal jurisdiction over the operator of the Arizona school.' 58 Using the three-prong Texas Test, 159 the court found that Texas could
acquire jurisdiction. 160 The court in Siskind at least partially relied on
the Arizona school's listing in the Texas telephone directory yellow
pages in satisfying the first prong of the Test. 16 1 The court's reliance
on this is an important distinction for future Internet cases because
publication in a telephone directory is much more directed than a national publication, and national publications are akin to Internet websites. 6 2
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See id. at 436. Siskind refers to this as the O'Brien test (developed in O'Brien
v. Lanpar Co., 399 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. 1966)). This test was modified in Schlobohm.
See supra text accompanying notes 36-42.
160. See Siskind, 642 S.W.2d at 436.
161. See id. See also Wilkerson v. Fortuna Corp., 554 F.2d 745, 748-49 (5th Cir.
1977). In Wilkerson, a New Mexico defendant advertised through the El Paso yellow
pages, newspaper, radio, and television as well as engaging in other promotional activities. The court held that the defendant's actions were directed and continuous
enough to give the Texas court general jurisdiction since Texas residents were the
primary patrons of the defendant, whose business was solicited through those advertisements. See id. However, the court's ruling in Wilkerson is suspect due to its reliance on the Supreme Court's opinion in National Geographic Society v. California
Board of Equalization,430 U.S. 551 (1977). The issue in NationalGeographicwas not
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant but dealt instead with the collection of taxes on mail order sales in the District of Columbia by a company based in
California. See id. at 552-53.
162. However, the court never addresses whether or not the plaintiff in Texas actually used the telephone directories. In fact, the plaintiff first learned of the defendant
through a nationally circulated publication. See Siskind v. Villa Found. For Educ.,
Inc., 642 S.W.2d 434, 435 (Tex. 1982). Further, there is some confusion as to what acts
of the defendant were enough to satisfy prong one of the Texas test. The court in
Siskind states that "[clonsidering Villa's [telephone directory] advertising in conjunction with its practice of mailing informational packets, applications for admission, invitations to re-enroll, and enrollment contracts to Texas residents, it is apparent that
Villa is affirmatively seeking business in Texas ...[that amounts to] a purposeful act
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The second prong of the Texas Test was satisfied by the plaintiff's
allegations of injury through defendant's advertising, and through the
mail and phone communications between the plaintiff and the Arizona corporation. 63 The Arizona defendant in Siskind cited numerous Texas authorities holding that contracts negotiated by mail cannot
support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresidents. 164 But
the court in Siskind found that those cases could be distinguished be-

cause (1) in none of those cases had the nonresident defendants solicited business in Texas to the same degree, and (2) none of those cases
involved allegations of misrepresentation and deceptive165 trade practices arising out of the defendant's contacts with Texas.
The opinion in Siskind highlights the importance of directed advertisement and of cumulative actions by the defendant which rise to the
level of purposeful acts done in Texas.1 66 Although the Texas plaintiff

first contacted the nonresident defendant through undirected, nationally circulated advertising, the subsequent interactions were used as
the basis of maintaining jurisdiction in Texas.16 7 This fact pattern may

arise in web-site cases where the injury claimed arose after subsequent
interactions between the plaintiff and the defendant, as was the case in

Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc.,168 Compuserve Inc. v. Patterson,169 and Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo

Dot Corn, Inc."7 ° The purposefulness of the defendant's actions is always important. But, "the stronger the form of the purposefulness,
'171
the less substantial must be either the effect or the other contacts.

This is what makes interactive web-site cases inherently simpler than
passive web-sites. In interactive web-site situations, the defendant's
committed in Texas." Id. at 436 (citing Vencedor Mfg. Co. v. Gougler Indus., 557 F.2d
886, 891 (1st Cir. 1977) (emphasis added)).
163. See Siskind, 642 S.W.2d at 437.
164. See id. (citing, e.g., U-Anchor Adver. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. 1977)). See
also Barnstone v. Congregation Am Echad, 574 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1978).
165. See Siskind, 642 S.W.2d at 437.
166. See id. at 436. See also Portland Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Bernstein, 716 S.W.2d
532, 536-7 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref d n.r.e.) (relying on Siskind in
holding that nonresident defendants could be haled into Texas court where allegations
of misrepresentation come from various phone calls to Texas, letters sent to Texas,
and visits to Texas).
167. See id. at 463.
168. 939 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing as relevant the fact that after an
initial inquiry from U.S. citizens to the Italian defendant's web-site, the defendant
directed information back to the forum through the Internet, and received fax transmissions, and later, money payments to receive further Internet service).
169. 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing as important the fact that after contracting
with Ohio plaintiff, the defendant directed wire communications to the plaintiff for
three years and used the plaintiff's services to sell products).
170. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (citing as relevant the fact that after the
defendant received inquiries from residents of the plaintiff's forum, the defendant
directed information back, and entered nearly 3,000 agreements to provide its services
to individual and corporate residents of that forum).
171. Prejean v. Sonatrach, Inc., 652 F.2d 1260, 1269 (5th Cir. 1981).
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accumulated actions will make the purposefulness of his acts more apparent, thus less of an issue. Hence, unless the plaintiff's claim arises
from the server-based web-site advertising itself-the analogous situation to Jetco-a Siskind-like analysis is necessary to find minimum
contacts to satisfy due process in Texas.
C. Conclusion: The Nexus Between Actions and Injury is Vital to
Acquiring PersonalJurisdictionin Texas
Neither nationally circulated advertising alone, nor injury suffered
by a Texas plaintiff alone, is enough to satisfy the requirements of the
Texas Test in maintaining personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. But if both are present, and a nexus between the two is
formed by looking at the defendant's intentions or expectations, then
the maintenance of personal jurisdiction is proper.
The actions of placing some injurious writing or mark in an undirected publication, or even an injurious statement over telephone
lines, may not constitute purposeful availment to satisfy due process.
The court must find that the defendant directed her actions. It is almost always "foreseeable" that some action will injure some party in
Texas. But this is not enough. In order to maintain personal jurisdiction, the court must find some evidence from the defendant's actions
that those actions were intended to injury a party in Texas. Texas
courts have indicated that this analysis is necessary in paper and wire
communications. The added abstraction of video and magnetic intermediaries in the actions of the parties, i.e. computers, is not distinguishing. Hence, Texas precedent can be used to show that the owner
of a web-site launched in the stream of commerce can be haled into
the state court.
III.

PERSONAL JURISDICTION ANALYSIS

OF WEB-SITES IN

OTHER STATES

A.

No Minimum Contacts

Although the findings of courts outside of Texas are not binding
authority, they give excellent guidance in how Texas courts should analyze personal jurisdiction issues. In particular, looking at courts
outside of Texas is relevant to the issue of obtaining personal jurisdiction because most states have adopted similar legal standards in their
long-arm statutes which allow jurisdiction to the extent of federal due

process. 172 Further, there are no cases on point to date dealing with

personal jurisdiction over the creators of web-sites on the Internet in
Texas, making extra-jurisdictional comparisons more compelling. The
discussion in this Part focuses on passive web-site cases. Specifically,
the discussion focuses on the defendant's actions in creating the web172. See CRUMP ET AL., supra note 20, § 2.02[3].
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site and placing it on a server, highlighting the relevant facts that an
analysis of personal jurisdiction in Texas should take into account and
the pitfalls to avoid.
The earliest case on point involves computer mediated communication between states in Pres-Kap v. System One, Direct Access, 17 3
where a computer system lessor in Florida brought an action for
breach of contract with its lessee in Delaware. The Florida-based
plaintiff attempted to acquire personal jurisdiction over the Delaware
defendant based on (1) the fact that the defendant forwarded all
rental payments under the contract to lease to the plaintiff in Florida,
and (2) the defendant's access to the plaintiff's computer database located in Miami.'17 The Florida court in Pres-Kap concluded that it
could not maintain personal jurisdiction based on these contacts. 7 5
The court in Pres-Kap concluded that since there was no showing
that the Delaware defendant was aware of the exact "electronic location"'176 of the computer database in question, the defendant could not
be said to have purposefully availed itself of the Florida court. 177 As a
secondary argument, the court cites what amounts to public policy factors for not finding personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 178 The
court in Pres-Kap, in other words, did not look to the actions of the
defendant, nor to the defendants intent or knowledge in contacting
the plaintiff's computer. Instead, the court focused on the defendant's
lack of knowledge of the database location.
In Pres-Kap, the Delaware defendant had a contract with the plaintiff and an agreement that allowed the defendant to access, via computer and telephone lines, the plaintiff's database. 7 9 When the
defendant accessed those data bases, he could certainly expect that
the plaintiff either had direct control over the computer that the data
base was on or indirect control through some other person or entity.
Although the location of the computer matters, the party's intention to
contact the plaintiff who controlled the computer information should
173. 636 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
174. See id. at 1353.
175. See id.
176. Id.
177. See id.
178. See id. In holding that the court did not have personal jurisdiction over the
defendants, the court stated that
a contrary decision would, we think, have far-reaching implications for business and professional people who use "on-line" computer services for which
payments are made to out-of-state companies where the database is located .... Such a result, in our view, is wildly beyond the reasonable expectations of such computer-information users, and, accordingly, [acquiring
jurisdiction would] offend[ ] traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.
Id. Thus, in one of the few cases to find personal jurisdiction lacking, the holding
seemed to rest not on minimum contacts but on fair play, the equivalent of (3) in the
Texas Test discussed supra Part I.A.
179. See Pres-Kap, 636 So. 2d at 1352.
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be the controlling factor. In Pres-Kap,the defendant did not intend to
make an attenuated contact with Florida or any "electronic location,"
rather, the defendant specifically intended its actions to be directed at
a Florida resident, in this case the plaintiff.
The dissenting opinion in Pres-Kap recognized the "fact that the
ownership of the computer base may have changed over the years is
immaterial."18 The database was supplied by the plaintiff, irrespective of its location.181 That the plaintiff supplied the database is important, because server computers are under the control of specific
entities from which web-sites reside. If the court held that by placing
the information on a server computer it is "published," then its subscribers may obtain jurisdiction over them if the entity or person in
control of the server knows or should have known that there are subscribers in Texas.' 82 In turn, Texas may acquire jurisdiction over the
author of the information
or writing. The nebulous concept of an
"electronic location"' 83 is as much a red herring as that of "Cyberspace" and should be avoided in future analysis.
It is likely, given a similar contract case like Loumar,1 84 that Texas
would hold the same as the majority in Pres-Kap. Unfortunately, the
Pres-Kap analysis is a poor example of how Texas should analyze wire
communications. A better approach would be the following: What if
the defendant had called the Florida company directly by phone and
had spoken with a person instead of a computer to acquire the information he had needed? Would this action avail the defendant of Florida jurisdiction? Texas precedent suggests no, unless the injury
claimed by the plaintiff arose from that phone call.' 85 Texas courts
have held that they may acquire personal jurisdiction through a single
contact initiated by the defendant, as in the Pres-Kap case, when there
has been a tort committed in the state of Texas. 186 Thus, under Texas
precedent, the decisive factor would be the nexus between the defendant's actions and injury in the state, not, as the Pres-Kap court found,
180. Id. at 1354 n.1 (Barkdull, J., dissenting). See also Michael J. Santisi, Note,
Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One, Direct Access, Inc.: Extending the Reach of the LongArm Statute Through the Internet?, 13 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 433
(1995) (applying foreseeability test in finding that the Pres-Kap court should have
found personal jurisdiction existed, agreeing with dissenting judge).
181. See Pres-Kap, 636 So. 2d at 1354.
182. See supra Part I.C.
183. Pres-Kap, 636 So. 2d at 1353.
184. 698 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1983). See supra Part II.A.1.
185. See Curry v. Williams, 880 F. Supp. 487 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (holding that no injury
arose from phone conversations initiated by plaintiff); Memorial Hosp. Sys. v. Fisher
Ins. Agency, Inc., 835 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied)
(holding personal jurisdiction was based on injury arising from single phone call to
defendant).
186. See Southwest Offset, Inc. v. Hudco Publ'g Co., 622 F.2d 149, 151 (5th Cir.
1980) (citing Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1974));
Memorial Hosp., 835 S.W.2d at 650.
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the lack of knowledge on the part of the defendant in the location of
the computer.
The New York court in Bensusan Restaurant v. King1 87 is one of the
latest decisions to look at the issue of personal jurisdiction over websites on the Internet. In Bensusan, the owner of a night club in New
York, who also owned a web-site advertising his nightclub, filed an
action against a Missouri night club owner who also advertised on the
Internet. 18 Both the New York plaintiff's and the Missouri defendant's night clubs were named "The Blue Note," and this name was
used in the defendant's web-site. The action was brought against the
Missouri defendant for infringement on the plaintiff's federally registered trademark.
The defendant's web-site was a general access site, meaning that no
authorization is required to obtained access to the site.1 89 The defendant's web-site also had a phone number that could be used to
purchase tickets to the Missouri club, but the tickets had to be picked
up at the club in Missouri. Perhaps to avoid any confusion that the
defendant knew he might be causing, the defendant's web-site also
offered a disclaimer that his club should not be confused with "The
Blue Note" club based in New York, and it contained a hyperlink' 90
to allow the user to go to the plaintiff's web-site.
The New York court in Bensusan held that (1) there was no tort
committed enabling long-arm jurisdiction over the Missouri defendant, and (2) even if the New York long-arm statute is satisfied, maintaining personal jurisdiction would violate federal due process. 19 1 In
the court's analysis, it was determined that there was no offer or attempt to sell a 1product
in New York, therefore, there was no trade92
mark violation.
The court in Bensusan found that the defendant's web-site was not
the equivalent of "advertising, promoting, selling or otherwise making
an effort to target its product in New York."'193 The court found that
the defendant did not direct any activity to New York, relying heavily
on the fact that "[i]t takes several affirmative steps by the New York
resident ... to obtain access to the Web site and utilize the informa187. 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
188. See id. at 297.
189. See id.

190. The fact that the defendant's web-site contained a hyperlink to the plaintiff's
web-site is common, but is of little significance to the court's analysis of personal
jurisdiction in this case. It may become important in cases where jurisdiction is
founded on actions of "doing business" instead of simply the commission of a single
tort in the state. Further, the existence and type of hyperlink on the defendant's website may indicate the defendant's intent, purpose, knowledge, etc. This Comment suggests that the latter should have been an indicator of the defendant's intent in
Bensusan.
191. See Bensusan Restaurant Corp., 937 F. Supp. at 299-301.

192. See id. at 299.
193. Id.
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tion there. 19 4 Furthermore, the court cites as important to its analysis the fact that even if a New York user were to get information from
the defendant's web-site, he would have to go to Missouri to purchase
tickets, thus creating a trademark infringement in Missouri. 195 In
other words, in spite of the confusion that the defendant's web-site
may cause, unless there is an actual attempt to sell, or a sale does take
place in New York, there is no tort. Further, the plaintiff must also
allege "significant economic injury" in the use of its trademark. 1 96 According to the court, mere use of the plaintiff's "The Blue Note" logo
alone is not enough to satisfy the New York long-arm statute.
In finding that due process could not be satisfied in acquiring jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant, the court in Bensusan stated
that "[c]reating a [web-]site, like placing a product into the stream of
commerce, may be felt nationwide-or even worldwide-but, without
97
more, it is not an act purposefully directed toward the forum state.'
The plaintiff argues that the defendant in Missouri should have foreseen that users in New York could access the site and become confused as to the relationship between the two "Blue Notes."' 198 But the
court finds that the defendant did not actively conduct business in
New York or encourage sales of tickets in New York. 199 The conclusion of the court in Bensusan seems to be that confusion does not rise
to the level of a tortious injury.
While the analysis in Bensusan may comport with New York legal
precedent, 0 ° the same analysis would likely fail in Texas. First, in
Texas cases, the analysis surrounding torts committed by parties
outside the state does not hinge on the actual injury that has occurred
or that is likely to occur in Texas. 20 ' Texas courts consider intellectual
194. Id.
195. See id.

196. See id. at 300. In order for the long-arm statute to reach out to a non-resident
defendant, the court concludes that the New York long-arm statute requires substantial revenue from interstate commerce, not mere participation in it. See id. Compare
the law in Texas, infra note 201 and the text accompanying the note.
197. Id. at 301.
198. See id. at 300.

199. See id. at 301.
200. This in itself is questionable. For instance, in Transamerica Corp. v. Transfer
Planning,Inc., 419 F. Supp. 1261 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), the district court held that the court
did have personal jurisdiction over the out-of-state company that used the in-state
plaintiff's trademark, but admittedly had no clients. Therefore, the defendant company could not have caused an injury. Jurisdiction was based not on the actual injury,
but instead on the defendant's contacts. These contacts included a national mailing of
5,000 brochures to interested companies, 100-250 of which ended up in New York,
and one advertisement in the Wall Street Journal. See id. at 1262. Following the
court's opinion in Transamerica,the Bensusan court's holding is questionable.
201. See supra Part II.A.2. The court in Prejean v. Sonatrach, Inc., 652 F.2d. 1260,

1269 (5th Cir. 1981), held that for purposes of acquiring personal jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants, the magnitude of the injury in the forum is one of three factors to consider. In Prejean,the court found that even though the plaintiffs may have
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property violations and unfair trade to be intentional in nature, 0 2 and
a showing of consumer confusion is the only test in determining infringement.2 °3 Second, in situations where a party has launched a
writing into the stream of commerce, Texas courts look to the intent of
the defendants to direct their activity at the Texas plaintiff. 2

4

For in-

stance, in Jetco there was no discussion of actual injury to the plaintiff.
In light of the Texas court's ruling in Jetco, a Texas court would likely
rule in favor of maintaining jurisdiction in Texas in a Bensusan-like
scenario.
B.

Contacts that Satisfy Due Process

1. Passive Web-Sites
In contrast to the ruling in Bensusan, three courts in substantially
similar actions of trademark violations on Internet web-sites have
ruled in favor of maintaining personal jurisdiction over the owner of a
web-site.20 5 In each of these cases, the courts look to the tortious injury itself and the defendant's intent in his actions. In no case does

the court discuss the defendant's knowledge of exact computer locations as in Pres-Kap,2 °6 nor the extent of actual injury as in Bensusan.20 7 In courts that have found that jurisdiction exists over
Internet web-sites based out-of-state, the primary analysis was the
nexus between the forum and the defendant's intent in his actions.
a.

Torts Effects Approach

The California decision in Panavisionv. Toeppen ° 8 is an interesting
juxtaposition to the decision in Bensusan. While the court in Bensusan focuses on the lack of any actual injury to the plaintiff, the court
in Panavision concentrates on the defendant's intent in his actions. In
Panavision,intent is everything. Specifically, the Illinois defendant20in9

Panavision used the name "PANAVISION" as a domain address

suffered an injury, the injury did not arise from the actions of the defendant in Texas.
See id. at 1268.
202. See Hupp v. Siroflex of Am., Inc., 848 F. Supp. 744, 748 (S.D. Tex. 1994)
(claiming patent infringement and unfair competition claimed; nonresident defendant
encouraged wholesalers to sell infringing product nationwide).
203. See Oleg Cassini, Inc. v. Cassini Tailors, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 1104, 1108 (W.D.
Tex. 1990) (descriptive trademark infringement). Otherwise, the merits of the case
need not be adjudicated. See supra note 27.
204. See Jetco Elec. Indus. v. Gardiner, 325 F. Supp. 80, 83 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
205. See Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Panavision Int'l v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616 (C.D. Cal. 1996); Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction
Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
206. See Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One, Direct Access, Inc., 636 So. 2d 1351, 1353
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
207. See Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
208. 938 F. Supp. 616 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
209. A domain address is an alphanumeric name given to a particular web-site on a
server computer so that it can be easily identified and reached by users, similar to a
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for a web-site he created.21 0 The California plaintiff, Panavision International, filed suit against the defendant when Panavision International tried to create its own web-site on the Internet, only to find that
it could not use the company name as a domain address because the
defendant acquired the name "Panavision" first.21 ' As it turns out,
the Illinois defendant had many web-sites using domain addresses
similar to the trademarked names of major companies.2 12 The plaintiff claimed that the defendant infringed on the "Panavision" trademark with the intention to extort money.2 13 The court agreed.
The California analysis of personal jurisdiction is similar to that in
Texas, in that both states look to the limits of federal due process.21 4
In Panavision, the court held that California had specific jurisdiction
using a Tort Effect Test, which states that in a tort setting the court can
maintain personal jurisdiction "predicated on (1) intentional actions
(2) expressly aimed at the forum state (3) causing harm, the brunt of
which is suffered-and which the defendant knows is likely to be suf' 215
fered-in the forum state.
The court in Panavision identified the key factual features in the
analysis: The term "Panavision" is valuable to the plaintiff, and the
registration of that name as a domain address would be valuable; the
defendant identified Panavision as a business which did not have a
registered domain address; the defendant committed the act of using
the domain name and registering it for his use; and the act of the defendant has caused harm to the plaintiff, the brunt of which will be felt
in California. 1 6
The court in Panavision does not cite any specific injury to the
plaintiff, nor does it know for "sure" that the defendant intended to
harm the plaintiff. The court infers many of its conclusions from the
facts in the case, stating that the defendant's actions were "anything
but random, fortuitous or attenuated" actions and were not "untargeted negligence," but acts aimed at a California company. 7 The
person's mailing address. Andrew R. Basile, Jr., Rights to Domain Names, in ONLINE
LAW, THE SPA's LEGAL GUIDE TO DOING BUSINESS ON THE INTERNET § 14 (Thomas

J. Smedinghoff ed., 1996).

210. See Panavision, 938 F. Supp. at 619.
211. See id. See also Richard P. Klau, Online, STUDENT LAWYER, Jan. 1996, at 14
(discussing the legal issues surrounding domain name ownership); Basile, supra note
209, at 229 (domain names).
212. See Panavision, 938 F. Supp. at 619 (e.g., deltaairlines.com; eddiebauer.com;
frenchopen.com; neiman-marcus.com). See also Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F.
Supp. 1227 (N.D. I11.1996) (holding that defendant's use in a domain address created
a likelihood of confusion).
213. See Panavision, 938 F. Supp. at 619.
214. See Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Indus., 11 F.3d 1482, 1484 (9th Cir. 1993);
Schlobohm v. Schapiro, 784 S.W.2d 355, 357 (Tex. 1990).
215. Panavision, 938 F. Supp. at 621 (quoting Core-Vent, 11 F.3d at 1486).
216. See id.
217. Id. at 621.
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court specifically cites the Supreme Court case of Calder to support its
Effects Test analysis as the valid analysis in this setting of web-site
jurisdiction. 18
Perhaps the only problem with the analysis in Panavision is the
court's attempt to distinguish Bensusan.1 9 The defendant's actions in
Bensusan, although perhaps not as egregious as those in Panavision,
are not so distinguishable. Indeed, if intention is as vital to the analysis as set out in Panavision,then the defendant in Bensusan can clearly
be said to have purposefully availed itself of the New York court-the
defendant clearly acknowledged in his web-site that he might have
created confusion about his nightclub in the marketplace! 220 However, the analysis in Panavisionis excellent with respect to the issue of
personal jurisdiction, and there are many similarities to the opinion in
Jetco. Most importantly, the courts in Jetco and Panavisionrely heavily on the inferred intention of the defendant from his tortious activity
in the forum state. This parallel in analysis supports the use of Jetco in
any future Texas litigation over web-site personal jurisdiction.
b. Stream of Commerce Approach
A Connecticut court has decided another domain name trademark
violation involving a web-site in Inset Systems v. Instruction Set. 21
Unlike Panavision, the intent of the nonresident defendant to violate
a trademark and cause injury is not as clear from the facts, which
makes this case an interesting comparison to Panavision. Thus, the
issue is how a Texas court analyzes personal jurisdiction when the intent to cause injury is not clear.
Unlike the Effect Test approach of the California court in Panavision, which resembles the Tort Effects analysis, 2 the Connecticut
court in Inset takes a Stream of Commerce 223 approach in maintaining
personal jurisdiction over the nonresident plaintiff. But this does not
change the result of the case; using the Stream of Commerce approach
to the case merely gives the court a different analytical framework to
look at the problem. In Inset, a Massachusetts company named Instruction Set registered the domain address "INSET.COM" for its
web-site, and filed for registration as the owner of the federal trademark INSET.22 4 The Connecticut plaintiff is Inset Systems. The
plaintiff claimed that the defendant had violated, among other things,
federal trademark law.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

See id.
See id. at 621-22.
See Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
See supra Part II.B.1.
See supra Part II.B.2.
See Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 162-63.
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As an initial part of its analysis, the court in Inset looks to its longarm statute, 2 5 much like the New York court in Bensusan. The court
in Inset finds that through the defendant company's advertising on the
Internet, it has availed itself of the Connecticut court through its solicitation of business.2 2 6 Unlike Texas cases involving national advertising,22 7 the commission of a tort was not considered the basis of
jurisdiction. 228 The court bases its reasoning on past Connecticut precedent which holds that advertisements in hard-copy print "whose circulation clearly includes Connecticut demonstrates a sufficiently
repetitious pattern to satisfy [the long-arm statute]. 229 The court
notes that there are at least 10,000 access sites in Connecticut, and
compares this to the delivery of infringing hard-copy print sent to residents in Connecticut.2 3 °
The court in Inset also finds that maintaining personal jurisdiction is
consistent with due process. 231 The court bases its finding of minimum contacts with the Massachusetts defendant on the theory that it
could "reasonably anticipate" being haled into a Connecticut court,
thus purposefully availing themselves of the forum.2 32 The court finds
that the defendant "directed its advertising activities via the Internet
and its toll-free number toward not only to the state of Connecticut,
but to all states. '233 Further, the court in Inset relies heavily on the
fact that the defendant's advertisement can possibly reach 10,000 Internet users in the forum.23 4
While it is likely that, given a similar set of circumstances as in Inset,
Texas courts could acquire personal jurisdiction over the owner of the
web-site, the analysis in that case is not consistent with Texas precedent. There are two problems with the Inset analysis that Texas courts
should avoid. First, the Inset court never mentions knowledge or purpose on the part of the defendant. Although the court mentions that
225. See id. at 163.
226. See id. at 164.
227. See Bounty-Full Entertainment, Inc. v. Forever Blue Entertainment Group,
Inc., 923 F. Supp. 950, 957 n.4 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (holding that marketing activity alone
is not sufficient for general personal jurisdiction); Siskind v. Villa Found. For Educ.,
Inc., 642 S.W.2d 434, 436-37 (Tex. 1982) (holding that nationally circulated publication
alone not enough; personal jurisdiction found from cumulative effect of more directed
contacts in Texas yellow pages and letters and phone calls sent from defendant to
forum).
228. See Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 164.
229. Id. (quoting McFaddin v. Nat'l Executive Search, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 1166, 1169
(D. Conn. 1973) (stating six advertisements over a six month period in a newspaper
"whose circulation clearly includes Connecticut" was solicitation according to the
long-arm statute).
230. See id.
231. See id. at 165.
232. See id.
233. Id.
234. This is presumably the number of people who have online Internet service in
the state. See id.
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there are 10,000 access sites to the Internet in Connecticut, 3 5 it never
discuss the defendant's knowledge or intentions with respect to causing an injury in that forum. This is a vital aspect to forming the required nexus for personal jurisdictional in Texas.2 36
Second, as an important feature of its analysis, the Inset court sets
Internet advertising apart from radio, television, and print in that the
Internet is available continuously to a user of the Internet. 2 37 This
distinction between radio, television, hard-copy print and a web-site
on the Internet is erroneous, and prior court precedent in Texas indicates that any distinction is merely technical at best.238 The ease and
convenience of the Internet is not enough alone to allow courts to
acquire personal jurisdiction over the web-site owners. The Texas
Supreme Court in Siskind has implied that in order to find that a defendant has purposefully directed his actions at Texas, a defendant
must do more than advertise in a nationally distributed medium.2 3 9 In
other words, merely launching something into the stream of commerce that happens to come into Texas is not enough for personal
jurisdiction. 24 ° The full Stream of Commerce analysis must include
some directed activity and some injury in the forum state. 241 The
Texas case Jetco makes it clear the injury that arises from the advertising must be directed at the forum 2 42 and the number of contacts is not
a controlling factor.2 43 Further, Loumar and Curry are on point on
the issue in Inset: Advertising in a nationally distributed medium is
not enough alone for a Texas court to maintain personal jurisdic235. See Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 164.
236. See supra text accompanying notes 107-10. See also supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the importance of finding an intent in the defendant's actions); Part II.B.1 (discussing Jetco).
237. See Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 163.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 45 and 110. See also supra Part I.C.
239. See Siskind v. Villa Found. For Educ., Inc., 642 S.W.2d 434, 436-37 (Tex. 1982)
(citing the defendant's advertising in Texas phone books, along with directed mailings
and phone conversations as relevant factors in maintaining personal jurisdiction,
while not citing as important the defendant's extensive national advertising where in
fact the plaintiff first learned of the defendant's services). See also Asahi Metal Indus., Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 110-11 (1987) (indicating that the Court has
adopted the position that the mere act of placing a product in the stream of commerce
is not enough of a "substantial connection" with the forum state to comport with due
process). "Additional conduct of the defendant may indicate an intent or purpose to
serve the market in the forum State ...." Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112. Given that the
Court does not distinguish tangible and intangible property, the "product" could be
some manufactured object as well as some form of advertising which distributes
marks owned by the advertiser. See supra Part I.B. See also Newton & Wicker, supra
note 63, at 539.
240. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295-96 (1980).
241. See supra Part I.B.1.
242. See Jetco Elec. Indus. v. Gardiner, 325 F. Supp. 80, 83 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
243. See id. See also Memorial Hosp. Sys. v. Fisher Ins. Agency, Inc., 835 S.W.2d
645 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ) (explaining that quality, not
quantity, of contacts is important for personal jurisdiction analysis).
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tion. 24 If a Texas court is to maintain jurisdiction in a fact situation
like that in Inset, the intent to do some injury directed at Texas must
be found before the defendant's actions can be said to be "purposeful" to satisfy the Texas Test. The court in Inset failed to do this.
2.

Interactive Web-Sites

A passive web-site that does nothing more than provide information does not vest a court with personal jurisdiction over its owner.2 45
But, as Panavision and Inset show, a passive web-site that creates an
injury itself within the forum can vest a court in the forum with personal jurisdiction over the owner of the web-site. When the facts of
the case reveal some interaction between the plaintiff and the defendant's web-site, the analysis must take these interactions into account.
But, the injury must still arise from those interactions. This is the case
in Maritz v. Cybergold,2 46 where jurisdiction arose from the injury of
the trademark violation itself and the cumulative effect of other defendant/plaintiff interactions that purposefully avail the defendant to
the forum state.
The facts of the Maritz case show how the defendant's intent, or
foreseeability, is less of an issue as the nexus between the defendant's
actions and the forum become more transparent. This comes about in
Maritz because of the web-site owner's affirmative steps in contacting
the forum. In Maritz, the Missouri plaintiff, Maritz, Inc., brought suit
against the California defendant, Cybergold, Inc., for federal trademark violation.2 47 The defendant had apparently violated some trademark owned by the plaintiff in the web-site that it posted on the
Internet.2 4 8 In the court's due process analysis of personal jurisdiction, the defendant's tortious activities and the infliction of economic
injury are the basis for personal jurisdiction analysis. 249 The court determines whether the defendant company has directed its activities
such that it could reasonably anticipate being haled into Missouri
244. See supra Part II.A.

245. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa.
1997).
246. 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
247. See id. at 1329.

248. See id. The exact nature of the violation was not discussed in the-case, only
that the action was for a federal trademark violation. See id. This is in sharp contrast
to the New York court in Bensusan, where the holding hinged upon the merits of the
trademark violation, an element of which is the injury caused. See Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Oleg Cassini, Inc. v. Cassini
Tailors, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 1104,1108 (S.D. Tex. 1990) (testing whether there is a "likelihood of consumer confusion"). In Texas, when courts are analyzing personal jurisdiction, the merits of the case are usually not discussed. See, e.g., Bounty-Full
Entertainment, Inc. v. Forever Blue Entertainment Group, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 950, 953
(S.D. Tex. 1996). See also supra note 27.
249. See Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1331.
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67

court.2 5 0 But, it is here that the court runs into trouble in its analysis.
Although the court acknowledges that past Missouri precedent would
find that the court could not maintain jurisdiction if the defendant's
advertising was hard-print, they find that in the case of an Internet
web-site, the court may maintain personal jurisdiction over a defendant who has caused injury in the state.2 5 ' Specifically, the court seems
to distinguish web-site advertising from mailings, calling web-site advertising "active solicitation" of business in Missouri.2
The court in
Maritz states that "analogies to cases involving the use of mail and
telephone are less than satisfactory in determining whether the defendafnt has 'purposefully availed' itself to this forum. '2 53 This is erroneous because, if a state does not consider advertising mailings as
active solicitation, then they should not consider a passive web-site as
such.
However, the Maritz court gets back on track in its analysis, focusing on the actions of the defendant in causing injury to the Missouri
plaintiff.25 4 First, the court looks to the nature and quality of the defendant's actions. The court looks to the fact that the defendant intentionally used the injurious mark in its web-site, and intentionally
placed the web-site on the Internet.2 5 5 Secondly, the court finds that
there was solicitation of people in Missouri for business because the
defendant responded 131 times to people in Missouri who viewed its
web-site.2 56 Thus, the defendant initiated contact 131 times to Missouri as a result of its web-site, which is clearly what it intended to do
by placing the web-site onto the Internet. 257 The court rightfully concludes the plaintiff's actions in contacting the defendant's web-site
250. See id. at 1332.
251. See id. at 1331. The cases that the court cites for its authority hold that nationally distributed hard-copy advertising is not enough to maintain jurisdiction when the
tortious injury arises from a contract with the nonresident defendants. See May Dep't
Stores Co. v. Wilansky, 900 F. Supp. 1154, 1161 (E.D. Mo. 1992); Peabody Holding
Co. v. Costain Group PLC, 808 F. Supp. 1425, 1433-34 (E.D. Mo. 1992). Therefore,
this makes the Maritz court's distinction of Internet advertising from hard-copy advertising suspect since these cases would not apply anyway. The Supreme Court in
Burger King, and the Texas Supreme court in U-Anchor, have held that a single contract between a plaintiff in the forum and an out-of-state defendant is not enough to
vest the court with personal jurisdiction. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471
U.S. 462 (1985); U-Anchor Adver., Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. 1977). See also
Hydrokinetics, Inc. v. Alaska Mechanical, Inc., 700 F.2d 1026, 1028-29 (5th Cir. 1983)
(rejecting the maintenance of personal jurisdiction over Alaskan defendant whose
sole contact with Texas was a single contract with Texas plaintiff).
252. See Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1332-33.
253. See id. However, the court correctly analogizes the sequence of actions in
hard-copy mailings and web-site interactions. See id. at 1333.
254. See id.
255. See id.
256. See id.
257. See id.
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should not be considered, only the defendant's acts. 58 This is because
the injury was created in the defendant's contacting the forum state,
not in the plaintiff-initiated contacts with the defendant. Finally, the
court concludes that the injury the plaintiff alleges "arises out of" the
defendant's actions.259 It is this latter part of the Maritz analysis that
is parallel to that in Siskind, the nexus between the defendant's intent
in his actions and the injury in the forum.
While the court in Maritz may use an analysis that is similar to that
in Siskind, the court's distinction between the Internet and other media is erroneous. The court in Maritz makes this distinction based on
the "more efficient, quicker" and "global" nature of the Internet.2"
Efficiency of a communications media is not a valid distinguishing factor in determining personal jurisdiction. Indeed, the Supreme Court
has acknowledged that communication will become more efficient
over time.26 ' That is why the Supreme Court adopted the flexible approach of InternationalShoe in finding personal jurisdiction.262 But
this does not do away with the necessity of finding some directionality
to the actions of the defendant. If anything, "efficiency" makes the
Internet less directional, not more.
C. Texas Should Adapt the Calder/Jetco Analysis for Passive WebSite Cases that Arise in Texas
The results reached in each of these cases are likely correct given
past court precedent in each jurisdiction. But the problem in these
cases for Texas courts lies in analysis-specifically, in distinguishing
web-sites from other forms of communication media. This false conclusion is likely the reason why the analysis in Bensusan, Panavision,
Inset, and Maritz varies. The facts of each case must be looked at
individually; there is no formula.26 3 On the other hand, there is simply
no reason for courts to create new rules for cases involving the Internet.264 The analysis of obtaining personal jurisdiction over the creator of a web-site, and indeed in any Internet case, remains the same
as it did in Schlobohm: "[D]id the nonresident defendant or foreign
corporation... purposefully do some act or consummate some transaction in the forum state ...265
[and] does the cause of action arise from
...such act or transaction.
258. The plaintiff could always try to create personal jurisdiction if the defendant's
actions were considered. See id. at 1333 n.4.
259. See id.
260. Id. at 1332.
261. See supra text accompanying note 48.
262. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-17 (1945).
263. See Schlobohm v. Schapiro, 784 S.W.2d 355, 358 (Tex. 1990).
264. See Zembeck, supra note 3, at 368 ("This note suggests that advertisement,
telephone, and environmental case law contains the proper paradigms to analyze
these novel [Internet] jurisdictional issues.").
265. Schlobohm, 784 S.W.2d at 358.
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Texas courts should follow the Calder/Jetco analysis when dealing
with passive Internet web-sites. The California case Panavisioncomes
closest to this at present. This court looks specifically at the intentions
of the defendant in his actions to create the nexus between the injury
and the defendant's links to the forum. When the actions between the
nonresident defendant and the forum are interactive as in Maritz,266
the closest Texas case is Siskind.2 67 If there is an allegation of a tort
being committed by the creator of a web-site,268 these cases offer the
best and most consistent approach to the analysis. If further interaction is generated between users in different forums such as in
Maritz,26 9 the analysis in Siskind should be used.
CONCLUSION

As the use of the Internet explodes, so too will the need for a consistent jurisprudence. Indeed, by substituting the appropriate case
law, the principles enunciated in this Comment should apply to all
jurisdictions in the United States. In all cases, a court's maintenance
of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is foundational
for Internet cases because of the global nature of this medium of communication. Unique as it is, the Internet is not distinguishable from
print or wire communications. The Internet is faster and more efficient but not fundamentally unique as a medium for advertising and
communications.
If its uniqueness is distinguishing at all it is in the versatility of the
Internet as both a passive and interactive medium. And, as the
Supreme Court has found, it is when passive communications are
launched into the stream of commerce that the nonresident's connection with the forum becomes particularly tenuous. This does not preclude a finding of personal jurisdiction, but it does make the analysis
more focused.
In obtaining jurisdiction over Internet web-sites, a Texas court must
find a nexus between the defendant's actions in making and placing
the web-site information onto a server computer and the injury it
causes in the forum state. If the defendant's actions are found to be
purposeful or intentional and the injury arises from these purposeful
activities of the defendant, the nexus is formed, and the maintenance
of personal jurisdiction is proper.
266. 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1333 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
267. 642 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. 1982).
268. When the nonresident owner of a web-site has generated substantial revenues
from doing business in Texas, coupled with other actions in Texas, but the injury does
not arise from the defendant's relationship to Texas, the analysis in Wilkinson v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 645 F. Supp. 318 (S.D. Tex. 1985), may allow the maintenance
of general personal jurisdiction over the defendant. See supra Part I.A. for a discussion of the Texas Test and general jurisdiction. See also supra note 120.
269. 947 F. Supp. at 1333.
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While there are no Texas cases to date dealing with the issue of
Internet jurisdiction, past Texas cases serve as authority on the issue.
Past cases in Texas that adjudicate issues of attenuated nonresident
activity are not only useful as analogies to future web-site cases, they
are binding authority. Furthermore, given that each forum has its own
unique personal jurisdictional analysis, relying on past precedent from
other forums may be misleading. In fact, some courts have been lead
astray in their analysis of personal jurisdiction over web-sites based on
their own precedent. This is erroneous and should be avoided by
Texas courts. The proper analysis takes into account the fact that
web-sites on the Internet have characteristics of writings in the stream
of commerce, while its physical manifestation is a stream of electrons.
Kevin M. Faulkner
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